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Abstract - This article examines the Court of Appeal decision in Pitt v Holt, and its
implications for the rule in Re Hastings-Bass. The article argues that there are some
inconsistencies between the post-Pitt position and other rules relating to the control of
trustee discretion, particularly fraud on a power and the standing of trustees to sue in
respect of their own breaches of trust. It also considers what is meant by saying a
power is 'fiduciary', and argues that it is wrong to categorise the duty created by Pitt
as fiduciary, as the Court of Appeal appears to do. Finally, it considers the reasons
why settlors may wish to restore the pre-Pitt position by careful drafting, and presents
a possible strategy by which they might do so.
A. INTRODUCTION
The Court of Appeal's judgment in Pitt v Holt-Futter v FutterI represents
a radical development of what was known as 'the rule in Re Hastings-
Bass'. Lloyd LJ delivered a powerhouse judgment which
comprehensively reinterpreted the rule from first principles. It is the
purpose of this article to conduct a detailed examination of the operation
of the new law, and ask if the post-Pitt position presents any discernable
difficulties. It will be argued that the new scheme created by Pitt is
deficient in a number of important respects.
In part B, the position of the law up to Pitt and the problems related
to it will be outlined to contextualise the discussion. The key points of the
judgment itself will also be discussed, including the two new categories
identified by Lloyd LJ. In part C, this scheme will be examined in detail
to try and work out how the two categories will apply in practice. Part D
will consider how the new scheme dovetails with other doctrines, with a
detailed examination of fiduciary doctrine in part E. Finally, in part F, the
practical consequences of the decision will be considered - does it spell
I am grateful to Professor Charles Mitchell, my dissertation supervisor, for his
invaluable advice and feedback on this article. Responsibility for any errors or
omissions remains, of course, with the author.
[2011] EWCA Civ 197, [2012] Ch. 132 (henceforth collectively referred to as Pitt
unless specified otherwise).
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change for settlors and trustees, or can the pre-Pitt position be restored
with careful drafting?
B. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT
1. The Origin of the Rule
Perhaps the greatest irony when considering 'the rule in Re Hastings-
Bass' is that the case from which it originated did not fit the pattern of the
cases that subsequently deployed the rule. The case of Re Hastings-Bass2
itself was mainly concerned with the question of whether it was possible,
where part of a distribution was void for perpetuity and part not, to sever
the void part of the distribution and proceed with the remainder. 3
However, near the end of the judgment, Buckley U gave the following
summary of principles in order, he thought, to add clarity to what was a
long and complex judgment: 4
To sum up the preceding observations, in our judgment, where by the terms of a
trust (as under section 32) a trustee is given a discretion as to some matter under
which he acts in good faith, the court should not interfere with his action
notwithstanding that it does not have the full effect which he intended, unless (1)
what he has achieved is unauthorised by the power conferred upon him, or (2) it
is clear that he would not have acted as he did (a) had he not taken into account
considerations which he should not have taken into account, or (b) had he not
failed to take into account considerations which he ought to have taken into
account.
It was part two of this statement of principle that was picked up on in the
case of Mettoy Pension Trustees v Evans.5 In that case, for the first time,
the rule was applied to allow trustees to reverse a decision that they had
made as a result of incorrect advice. It was accepted in principle that a
deed altering the provisions for the distribution of a pension surplus could
be invalid because the trustees had failed to realise that alterations were
taking place, although the court declined to do so as it could not be shown
that the pension trustees would have acted differently. This case held that
2 [1975] Ch. 25.
3 ibid 35.
4 ibid 41.
5 [1990] 1 WLR 1587, [1991] 2 All ER 513.
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there was a broad principle that could be applied wherever trustees had
failed to take into account considerations which they ought to have taken
into account, for whatever reason.6
This broad principle fell on fertile ground in the field of taxation.
Since the case of Green v. Cobham,7 the courts have routinely accepted
the argument that a trustee who makes a distribution and ignorantly
triggers some adverse tax consequence can have the transaction set aside,
even if they have had professional advice. The cases heard together in the
Court of Appeal in Pitt are typical examples of this class of case.
2. Problems with the Old Law
Before the Court of Appeal decision in Pitt, the law was in a state of some
considerable disarray. It is worth highlighting a few of the problems, in
order to get a sense of how badly comprehensive review was needed.
(a) Lack of Clarity
There were significant ambiguities in a number of areas, which created
some difficulty in determining the precise scope of the rule and how it
would be applied. These were some of the key debates.
(i) Void vs. Voidable
This was perhaps the most significant dispute in the cases. A large number
were ambiguous as to the consequence of the engagement of the rule - did
it render the transaction void, or merely voidable? As originally
formulated in Re Hastings-Bass, the principle was that the court 'should
not interfere' 9 with the decision of the trustees unless the rule was
infringed. The cases of Green v Cobham 10 and Abacus Trust Co. v
NSPCC11 held that the transaction would be void; Abacus Trust Co. v
Barr1 2 held that it was merely voidable. In Sieff v Fox,13 Lloyd U held
6 ibid at 555.
[2002] STC 820, [2000] 1 WTLR 1101.
Pitt (n 1).
9 Re Hastings Bass (n 2) 41.
10 [2002] STC 820, [2000] WTLR 1101.
"[2001] STC 1344, [2001] WTLR 953.
12 [2003] EWHC 114 (Ch.), [2003] Ch. 409.
13 [2005] EWHC 1312 (Ch.), [2005] 1 WLR 3811.
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obiter that the Barr view was attractive,14 but not open to the judge in the
light of the decision in Re Abraham's Will Trusts.15
These difficulties were exacerbated by a few cases in which bizarre
intermediate positions were reached. In Futter at first instance, for
example, the view was expressed that the result of the rule was that the
transaction was void, but that nonetheless relief was discretionary at the
instance of the court.1 6 This conclusion is perverse because the element of
court discretion is usually taken to be the chief difference between void
and voidable.' 7 That these observations were made 'without the benefit of
detailed argument'18 makes them all the more imprudent.
(ii) Would vs. Might
On the question of how the trustee would have acted had he taken into
account only and all relevant considerations, two approaches were
distinguishable. The first held that it was necessary to show that the
trustee would have acted differently, the second only that he might have.
Examples of the former approach can be found in Hastings-Bass'9 itself
and Mettoy Pension Trustees v Evans.20 The main cases taking the latter
21 2
approach are Kerr v British Leyland Trustees, Stannard v Fisons Ltd,22
and AMP UK v Barker.2 3
This debate was largely resolved in the case of Sieff v Fox, where
Lloyd LJ held that the 'might' standard would apply where the trustee
was obliged to exercise his discretion, and 'would' would apply where he
was not.24 Most commentators supported a division between the cases
along these lines; 25 however, doubt has also been expressed as to the
14 ibid [79].
15 ibid [81]; [1969] 1 Ch 463.
16 [2010] EWHC 449 (Ch.), [2010] STC 982 [33].
17 See eg David Hayton et al, Underhill & Hayton: Law of Trusts and Trustees ( 18 th
edn, Butterworths LexisNexis 2010) 856.
18 Futter (n 16) [33].
19 [1975] Ch. 25.
20 [1990] 1 WLR 1587.
21 [2001] WTLR 1071.
22 [1992] IRLR 27.
23 [2001] PLR77.
24 [2005] EWHC 1312 (Ch.)[77].
25 Charles Mitchell, 'Reining in the rule in Re Hastings-Bass' (2006) 122 LQR 35, 40;
David Hayton, 'Pension Trusts and Traditional Trusts: drastically different species
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relevance of the compulsory nature of the power or not, since 'the actual
exercise of it, as an act, is not different in quality or degree from the
exercise of a [non-compulsory] power.' 26 The answer to this question was
therefore never completely settled.
(iii) Fault
Most cases consistently held that there was no need to demonstrate that
the trustee had been at fault in any way in order to allow recovery. The
cases most strongly for this proposition are those where the failure to take
into account only and all relevant considerations is a result of incorrect
advice; in these cases, there is no question that the trustee had done
anything wrong. Perhaps the cleanest example of this is Sieff v Fox2 7 - the
trustees had acted entirely properly, taken advice on the relevant fiscal
consequences, and acted diligently upon it; the advice had simply been
wrong. Nonetheless, the transaction was void under the rule.
However, this no-fault approach has not been universal. In the case
of Abacus Trust Co. v Barr,28 a trustee made a distribution of 60% of a
fund when the settlor's true intention had only extended to 40%, as a
result of a mistake made by an intermediary. Adopting a duty-led
analysis, the court said: 2 9
If the Trustee has in accordance with his duty identified the relevant
considerations and used all proper care and diligence in obtaining the relevant
information and advice relating to those considerations, the Trustee can be in no
breach of duty and its decision cannot be impugned merely because in fact that
information turns out to be partial or incorrect.
In that case, it was held that such a breach had been established, because
the carelessness of the intermediary could be imputed to the trustee.
of trust' [2005] Cony. 229; John Mowbray et al, Lewin on Trusts (17th edn, Sweet &
Maxwell 2007) 1080.
26 Hayton et al (n 17) 855.
27 [2005] EWHC 1312 (Ch.).
28 [2003] EWHC 114 (Ch.), [2003] Ch. 409.
29 ibid [23] (Lightman J).
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(iv) Public Law Principles
Some cases have sought to develop the rule by drawing analogies with
public law principles. In particular, courts have used these analogies to try
and determine to what extent it is legitimate for them to substitute their
own judgment for that of the trustee in exercising his discretion. This
blending of the principles of public and private law was referred to
somewhat positively in the case of Edge v Pensions Ombudsman:30
It seems to us no coincidence that courts, considering the exercise of
discretionary powers by those to whom such powers have been entrusted (albeit
in different contexts), should reach similar and consistent conclusions; and
should express those conclusions in much the same language.
However, the appropriateness of importing these principles into the
private law context has been questioned. In Underhill & Hayton: Law of
Trusts and Trustees, it is pointed out that the focus of the public law and
trust law enquiries are different - 'The former focuses on the individual's
opportunity to be heard ... [the latter] on the information available to the
person making the decision.' 31 Furthermore, the authors argue, the public
law analogy runs the risk that an inexperienced judge might attempt to
import other elements of public law, whose applicability might be more
suspect.32
(b) Lack of Consistency with Mistakes Made by Individuals
Another problem was a lack of consistency between the approach taken to
Hastings-Bass type failures in the trust context, and similar mistakes made
by individuals. This point is made particularly by Bhandari, in the context
of decisions made with adverse tax consequences. 33 While noting that
individuals might be able to rely on the doctrines of rescission or
rectification, she observes that these remedies are significantly more
limited than the rule in Hastings-Bass. She says: 34
30 [2000] Ch. 602, [1999] 4 All ER 546, 567-8.
31 Hayton et al (n 17) 851; cf R v Charity Commissioners, Ex p. Baldwin [2001]
WTLR 137.
32 Hayton et al (n 17) 851.
33 Monica Bhandari, 'Tax Advantages for Bungling Trustees' (2009) eJournal of Tax
Research 7(1) 54.
34 ibid 62.
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The Hastings-Bass principle allows a transaction to be undone in cases where an
individual would have no success. Thus, there is a difference in the extent to
which trustees and individuals can undo transactions for tax purposes.
In Sieff v Fox, Lloyd LJ, with some academic support, 35 argued that this
differential treatment is justified on the basis that 'trustees are dealing
with assets which are not their own.' 36 This argument, however, is not
accepted by Bhandari, who argues that the relationship of trustee and
beneficiary should have no relevance to a transaction between the trustee
and some third party - since both the trustee and individual are legal
owners of the property in question, the treatment of both should be exactly
the same. Any protection the beneficiary requires should be provided
through the rules regulating that relationship. 37
3. A New Path - Pitt v Holt
Against this backdrop of dispute and confusion, the cases of Pitt v Holt
and Futter v Futter were heard together in the Court of Appeal. The facts
were of the by now standard Hastings-Bass mould. In the first, Mr. Pitt,
who had been injured in a serious road accident, had received substantial
compensation in 1994. Mrs. Pitt decided, on advice, to put the money into
a settlement trust. This trust was executed in a way that gave rise to a
significant inheritance tax charge - estimated at some f100,000 by the
time of Mr. Pitt's death in 2007.38 However, this was not realised until
2003. The prime purpose of the trust being to provide for Mr. Pitt's
welfare, no thought appeared to have been given to the tax consequences
- if it had been, the tax could very easily have been avoided.39
The second case concerned a straightforward tax avoidance device
that went wrong. Mr. Futter was the beneficiary of an offshore trust which
held significant stockpiled gains. On advice, he triggered some losses
which he intended to set off against the gain that would be made when the
stockpiled gains were brought onshore. Unfortunately, his advisors
overlooked section 2(4) of the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1994,
35 See eg Hayton et al (n 17) para 61.22, especially text accompanying fn 9.
36 Pitt (n 1) [85].
37 Bhandari (n 33) 68.
38 Pitt (n 1) [9].
3 [2010] EWHC 45 (Ch), [2010] 1 WLR 1199 [12].
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which prevented offsetting in this way. When the distributions were duly
made under the scheme, therefore, a significant tax charge was incurred.4 0
In both cases, it was held at first instance that the Re Hastings-Bass rule
applied and the relevant transactions would be declared void.
Lloyd U, who gave the leading judgment in the Court of Appeal,
took the opportunity to undertake an extensive re-appraisal of the
principles applicable in these cases. This was not his first such attempt; in
the case of Sieff v Fox, which he heard sitting as a judge at first instance,
he had attempted to resolve some of the inconsistencies in the law and
reach a more settled position. However, he had been bound to follow the
previous first instance authority and so the impact of his decision was
somewhat limited. This time his approach was much more radical.
(a) The Judgment
Lloyd U built up his judgment in stages, which it will be helpful to
examine in turn. The first was his observation that only the decision of Re
Hastings-Bass was binding upon him;41 all others were heard only at first
instance. This is an important point, since it allowed him significant
leeway when it came to interpreting the case law.
The second was to subject Re Hastings-Bass itself to a thorough re-
42
appraisal, in search of the true ratio of the case. A critical part of the
case, in his view, was Buckley U's treatment of what had been termed
the Revenue's 'fourth submission', namely that:43
in order to exercise the power of advancement by making a sub-settlement the
trustees must weigh the benefits to the advancee under the sub-settlement against
the other interests affected and for that purpose must have a proper
understanding of the effect of the sub-settlement. If they do not, they have not
validly exercised their power at all.
This submission, Lloyd U argued, had been 'rejected in terms' by
Buckley U in Hastings-Bass.44 Taking these two points together, he had
now cut almost the entire body of law relating to the Hastings-Bass rule
40 Futter (n 16) [8] - [17].
41 Pitt (n 1) [5], [46].
42 ibid [46]-[67].
43 ibid [50] citing Re Hastings-Bass (n 2) 29.
44 ibid [58].
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off from its origins and from any binding authority, and had a free hand to
* * 45
set about restructuring it in his own way.
Thirdly, he turned to his exposition of the law as correctly
understood.46 Building on the judgment in Barr,4 7 he recognised two
classes of case that were previously dealt with under the Hastings-Bass
rule. First:48
The purported exercise of a discretionary power on the part of trustees will be
void if what is done is not within the scope of the power.
His Lordship gave some examples of this type of exercise: 4 9
There may be a procedural defect, such as the use of the wrong kind of
document, or the failure to obtain a necessary prior consent. There may be a
substantive defect, such as an unauthorised delegation or an appointment to
someone who is not within the class of objects. Cases of a fraud on the power
are similar to the latter, since the true intended beneficiary, who is not an object
of the power, is someone other than the nominal appointee. There may also be a
defect under the general law, such as the rule against perpetuities, whose impact
and significance will depend on the extent of the invalidity.
The second category he described as follows:5 0
By contrast with the types of case to which I have referred at [96], above, if an
exercise by trustees of a discretionary power is within the terms of the power,
but the trustees have in some way breached their duties in respect of that
exercise, then (unless it is a case of a fraud on the power) the trustees' act is not
void but it may be voidable at the instance of a beneficiary who is adversely
affected.
Finally, he turned to the application of this new structure to the cases
before him. In respect of both, it was held that the fiduciary duty to take
into account only and all relevant considerations had been discharged,
45 ibid [68]-[95].
46 ibid [96]-[13 1].
47 [2003] EWHC 114 (Ch.), [2003] Ch. 409.
4 8 Pitt (n 1) [96].
49 ibid.
50 ibid [99].
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since both fiduciaries had consulted advisors and acted upon their
advice.
C. ANALYSING THE NEw REGIME
1. The scope of the Two Categories
If Lloyd LJ intends his new scheme to be used as a practical tool in
deciding how to dispose of cases, it is necessary to consider how exactly
cases will be divided between them. As will be seen, there are some
unresolved issues surrounding the precise scope and interaction of the two
categories.
(a) The First Category
Lloyd LJ's view was that the first category would be of limited use, and
would only be engaged in a few of the most extreme cases. He said: 52
In principle, cases where an act done by trustees which appears to be within their
powers can be held to be void ought in my judgment to be kept to a minimum,
just as at common law the cases where a transaction is void, rather than
voidable, are few and far between.
He supported this view on the basis of the damage to stability in
commercial arrangements that would be done if acts taken could be shown
many years later to have no effect. By contrast, if the act were merely
voidable, then the equitable defences exist to safeguard justice in the
individual case. While clearly not ideal in terms of legal certainty, it is
submitted that this greater flexibility is the more desirable option.
(i) Matthews' Alternative Analysis
However, Paul Matthews has presented an interpretation of the rule that
might lead to a different outcome. 5 3 In his view, the requirement to take
into account all and only relevant considerations is an implied term in the
trust deed; it is the default position (which the settlor can modify) that, in
order to constitute an exercise of the power held by the trustee, only and
5' ibid. As regards Futter v Futter [139]; as regards Pitt v Holt [163].52 ibid [101].
53 Hayton et al (n 17) 852-862.
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all relevant considerations must be taken into account.5 4 On this view,
every case where not only and all relevant considerations are taken into
account is an exercise of power outside the trust deed - the first category
identified by the Court of Appeal. Every case will therefore result in the
transaction being void, and the second category will have no role at all.
Against this analysis, two points may be made.
The first point is that this type of reasoning was clearly not in line
with the expectations of the Court of Appeal. Lloyd U was explicit in the
view that the first category would be confined within narrow limits (see
above), and so expansion along the lines outlined would be, at the very
least, surprising.
The second point is that Matthews' analysis, even as an explanation
of the previous case law, is flawed. We saw above that one of the main
features of the older cases has been a focus on the question of causation;
would (or might) the trustee have acted differently? But Matthews'
analysis seems to leave no room for this point; once the trustee has failed
to reach his decision in the proper manner, it is void, regardless of the
outcome of the decision. He writes:"
Hence, in the Hastings-Bass context, if the conduct stipulates for by the settlor is
a decision with due formality, the trustee-appointer being required to have taken
into account all and only relevant considerations, and the trustee has not done so,
the conduct has not occurred and so the power has not been exercised.
No reference at all is here made to the causal element that so occupied the
judges in the earlier cases. Although not strictly relevant to the new
position taken by the Court of Appeal, this point does undermine his claim
that implied terms are crucial to understanding what is happening in these
cases.
(b) The Second Category
It is not only the first category that Lloyd U envisaged having a limited
scope. In giving his judgment, Lloyd U said:56
54 ibid especially para 61.22.
5s ibid 858.
56 Pitt (n 1) [129].
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If the principle had been applied which I have set out above, then it seems likely
that a number of the cases decided at first instance would have been decided
differently ... But it is not a useful exercise for present purposes to re-examine
the earlier cases generally, and I will say no more on that subject.
This makes clear that the second category would be more limited in its
application than the old rule had been, but is less helpful on the question
of the precise extent of the duty. The relevant control factor here is the
question of what 'ought' to be taken into account by the trustee, 5 but no
clear guidance is given on what that might comprise.
The strategy adopted was to decide what ought to have been taken
into account on a case-by-case basis. Lloyd U said:58
It is not possible to lay down any clear rule as to the matters which trustees
ought to take into account when considering the exercise of a power of
advancement or some other dispositive discretionary power. Circumstances will
differ a great deal from one trust to another, and even within one trust they may
change from time to time or according to the nature of the particular exercise
which is under consideration.
In similar terms, Mummery U spoke of an inquiry by the court into the
nature of the duty and whether or not there had been a breach 'in the
particular case.' 59
However, while this approach may well suit an appeal court applying
an ex post facto review, it is perhaps less helpful for a trustee looking for
guidance as to what he must take into account when making his
decision.60 It is submitted that more should have been done to assist those
in that situation.
Some hints of an alternative approach are present in the judgment;
the Court set out some categories of considerations that 'may' be relevant
to the decision. Lloyd U dealt in some detail with fiscal consequences,61
5 This was specifically discussed by Lloyd LJ: ibid [114]-[118].
58 ibid [118].
59 ibid [238].
60 This failure to improve on the previous law has been noted in the online update to
John McGhee, Snell's Equity (32nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2011) para 10-033 and text
accompanying fn 160.
<http://www.snellsequity.co.uk/Chapter.aspx?PartlD=10&ChapterlD=53> accessed
on 2 July 2012.
61 Pitt (n 1) [115]-[116].
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as that had direct bearing on the case before him. He also noted several
other categories that may be relevant, namely the wishes of the settlor and
the 'wishes, circumstances and needs' of the beneficiary, and one
consideration that should not be taken into account - personal
disapproval.62 This type of indication will be of far more use to the trustee
who needs to know how to exercise his discretion on an everyday basis,
since he will at least know what he should be looking at. It is submitted
that it would be desirable if this type of lead were developed in future into
a more comprehensive group of considerations that, in general, trustees
should take account of.
Lloyd U rejected this categorisation approach, however, on the basis
that the duty needed to be flexible in order to take into account the range
of different circumstances that might apply to different trusts, and even
within the same trust over time. In particular, he referred to the following
example:63
It might be different if what was proposed was the release from the trust of a
relatively modest sum of capital to meet an extremely urgent need of one of
several beneficiaries. In such a case it might not be necessary to undertake the
same degree of enquiry and examination as it would be if the proposed
transaction affected a very large proportion of the trust fund, or was not required
as a matter of extreme urgency.
No doubt this is a concern, but with respect this flexibility could be
accommodated while at the same time giving some general guidance. The
example is a somewhat extreme one, and it would be perfectly sensible to
set out some general guidelines as to what would be required in the
normal case, but leave it open to the trustee to argue that, in these
particular circumstances, the duty was more restricted.
The courts have found it possible to lay down such general guidance
that maintains flexibility in respect of other duties on trustees. In Re
Baden (No. 2),64 for example, the Court of Appeal felt able to do so with
respect to how the question of distribution should be approached where
there was a broad power covering a large class of beneficiaries. Sachs U,
62 ibid [114].
63 ibid [117].
64 [1973] Ch. 9.
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for example, fleshed out the duty in the following way, referring to the
previous judgment of Lord Wilberforce:65
When looked at in the context of the rest of the speech this particular passage
does not seem to me to cause any difficulty. In my judgment it refers to
something quite different, to a need to provide a list of individuals or to provide
a closely accurate enumeration of the numbers in the class: it relates to that
width of the field from which beneficiaries may be drawn and which the trustees
should have in mind so that they can adapt to it their methods of discretionary
selection. Assessing in a businesslike way "the size of the problem" is what the
trustees are called on to do.
This general guidance was given despite the same concern over
differences between trusts in different circumstances: 66
The word "range," however, in that context has an inbuilt and obvious element
of considerable elasticity, and thus provides for an almost infinitely variable
range of vision suitable to the particular trust to be considered.
In this case, then, some general guidance could be given on the scope of
the duty, while recognising that there would be some flexibility for
individual circumstances. In light of this approach being adopted in other
cases, it is difficult to agree with the strong conclusion that clear guidance
for the trustees would be 'not possible'.
D. INCONSISTENCY WITH OTHER AREAS
Despite the appearance that Lloyd LJ's new scheme fits harmoniously
with other doctrine, there are several areas in which the scheme is
inconsistent with prior case law. Two examples will be examined here.
1. Fraud on a Power
In his judgment in Pitt, Lloyd LJ set up a bipartite distinction between
cases where an exercise of a power would be void (where it was outside
the power or in breach of the law)67 and those where it would be voidable
65 ibid 20.
66 ibid 20 (Sachs LJ).
67 Pitt (n 1) [96].
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(where it was exercised in breach of duty). 6 8 On its face, this distinction
neatly categorises all duties relating to the exercise of trust powers.
However, difficulties with the scheme begin to arise if one attempts
to examine in detail how each doctrine would fit within the taxonomy. A
good example of this is fraud on a power, which Lloyd U explicitly
discusses and appears to identify with category one:69
Cases of a fraud on the power are similar to [an appointment to someone who is
not within the class of objects], since the true intended beneficiary, who is not an
object of the power, is someone other than the nominal appointee.
Lloyd U clearly conceptualises fraud on a power as an extension of the
inquiry as to the scope of the power that has been conferred, and so
'similar' to the construction of the terms of the power. The difficulty with
this analysis is that the case law has by no means unambiguously treated
the fraud doctrine in this way. Admittedly, support for Lloyd U's view
can be found in earlier cases, such as Vatcher v Paull,70 where the court
said:"'
[Fraud in this context] means that the power has been exercised for a purpose, or
with an intention, beyond the scope of or not justified by the instrument creating
the power.
However, more modern discussions have moved away from the language
of scope and towards that of an 'improper exercise' of a power. In
Hillsdown Holdings plc v Pensions Ombudsman72 Knox J introduced as a
modem alternative to fraud on a power the term 'improper use of the
power for a collateral purpose.' 7 3 And similar language was used by the
New Zealand Court of Appeal in the case of Wong v Burt:74
The word "fraud" here denotes an improper motive, in the sense that a power
given for one purpose is improperly used for another purpose.
68 ibid [99].
69 ibid [96].
70 [1915] AC 372.
n1 ibid 378.
72 [1997] 1 All ER 862.
73 ibid 883.
74 [2005] 1 NZLR 91[28].
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This more modern terminology is the more appropriate, for two reasons.
First, because the focus of the inquiry in the fraud cases is as to the
subjective intentions of the trustee. Describing the fraud doctrine as
related to 'improper motives' focuses the mind of the court on the
appropriate question, namely what the trustee was intending by making
the distribution. Relating the inquiry to scope, on the other hand, gives the
misleading impression that the proper focus is on detailed technical
consideration of the terms of the trust and on 'reading in' limitations by
the trustee. Second, because a number of rules relating to the fraud
doctrine make little sense from the perspective of the scope analysis. For
instance, as was pointed out in Wong v Burt, it is the trustee's intention
that is key to working out if the exercise is invalid, not the substance of
the exercise. If the trustee's intention is to benefit a non-object the
exercise is void; if the trustee has no such intention, but the transaction
does in fact benefit a non-object, the exercise is valid.75 The intention-led
'improper motives' description points clearly towards this conclusion. The
scope analysis, however, is more uncomfortable with this rule, because
the distribution is not, in itself, outside the power conferred by the trust
deed.
Furthermore, this more modem analysis is supported by authorities
that have clearly treated the question of fraud on a power as entirely
separate from the construction of the terms of the power. An early
example is Henty v Wrey,76 in which Lindley LJ explicitly separated the
two questions, and warned that amalgamating them may lead to
'considerable confusion'. 7 Similarly, in Hillsdown Holdings Knox J,
referring to the decision in Re Vauxhall Motors Pension Fund, Bullard v
Randall78 said that '[t]here is absolutely no trace of [fraud on a power]
having been argued and it is clear that Browne-Wilkinson V-C did not
regard himself as doing more than decide a question of construction',
again indicating that construction of terms is a wholly separate enquiry to
79fraud on a power.
7 ibid [30], citing Vatcher v Paull (n 70).
76 (1882) 21 LR Ch.D. 332.
7 ibid 355.
78 [1989] 1 PLR 49.
79 [1997] 1 All ER 862, 883.
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The conclusion, then, is that it is inapposite to place fraud in the first
of Lloyd U's categories. The mindset-led approach indicates that the
fraud doctrine has more in common with the old Hastings-Bass rule than
with the construction of the terms - in both fraud on a power and
Hastings-Bass, the exercise is void because the trustee made his decision
on the basis of facts that should not properly influence his judgment. In
the words of Mummery U, both relate to the manner in which a power is
exercised, rather than its existence or extent. 80 This point can be
strengthened by noting that a fraud can, in most cases, be recast as an
infringement of the Hastings-Bass rule - where the trustee appoints to an
object knowing that the object will pass the property on to a non-object (a
fraud), and he takes into account that knowledge in making his decision,
which he ought not to do.
All of which presents a serious problem for Lloyd U's analysis,
since he placed fraud within category one but cases previously covered by
Hastings-Bass into category two. How can this difficulty be reconciled?
The solution is to recognise that Lloyd U's classification scheme is
confined to cases that fall within the Pitt pattern. That is, where the
trustee has failed to take into account only and all relevant considerations,
the effect might be either that the exercise is outside the scope of the
power, or is a breach of duty - but that does not preclude other categories
of defective exercise existing in other areas. This approach has the
advantage that it allows the fraud doctrine to exist in the intermediate
class between Lloyd U's two categories, dealing with improper motives
by the trustee but nonetheless resulting in the exercise of the power being
entirely void.
There is some textual evidence from Pitt to support this analysis. In
discussing the first category, Lloyd U remarked only that the fraud
doctrine is 'similar' to an exercise outside the scope of the power, and did
not directly equate the two. Although he discussed fraud on a power at
length, this discussion was not in relation to its placement within his
scheme, but was rather to clear up a collateral point in relation to the
void/voidable debate.8 1 Nowhere did he say that his two categories were
supposed to represent a comprehensive scheme for all rules relating to
80 Pitt (n 1) [233].
8 ibid [97]-[98].
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trustee discretion. Furthermore, at several points he made reference to
rules, such as the rule against self-dealing, that implied that they were
external to his scheme 82 - it appears he at least countenanced the
possibility that his new structure was not all-inclusive.
In any event, since both of the cases before him fell within his
second category and so were dealt with by the duty question, 83 his more
general comments in relation to the first were strictly unnecessary for his
decision, and may be taken to be obiter. To the extent that they appear to
suggest that fraud on a power belongs in category one, it is submitted that
they are incorrect and should not be followed.
2. Standing to Sue
In relation to cases within his second category, Lloyd U said: 84
One practical consequence, if I am right, is that if in future it is desired to
challenge an exercise by trustees of a discretionary power on this basis, it will be
necessary for one or more beneficiaries to grasp the nettle of alleging and
proving a breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the trustees. Only rarely would
it be appropriate for the trustees to take the initiative in the proceedings...
He then gave one example of when it 'may' be appropriate for the trustees
to take action:8 5
[I]f (as in Abacus v Barr) they need to seek directions from the court if a
beneficiary alleges breach of trust but does not bring his own proceedings.
The clear indication is that some dissatisfied beneficiary must initiate the
process of questioning the trustee's decision, even if it is the trustee
themselves that begins the formalised court process as a result. This signal
of disapproval at trustees bringing actions against their own breaches was
not made on the basis of authority; rather, Lloyd U seems to have seen it
as no more than a 'practical consequence' of his finding that it was
necessary to show a breach of fiduciary duty. 86
82 ibid [100].
83 See footnotes 50-51 and accompanying text.84 Pitt (n 1) [130].
ss ibid.
86 ibid [127], [130].
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Although passed off as an uncontroversial statement of principle,
this conclusion runs counter to a number of cases in which it has been
held that the trustees are entitled to sue upon their own default. The
context in which this most frequently arises is where one trustee sues his
co-trustees for a breach in which all participated. A good example of this
type of case is Butler v Butler.8 7 In that case, two trustees, P and D, had
sold land belonging to D to a builder, who financed the purchase by
mortgaging the land back to the trustees. P later brought an action against
D seeking a personal indemnity for losses arising from the fact that the
land was insufficient security. It was held, affirming the decision at first
instance,8 8 that P could not make D liable where he was a party to the
breach. However, it was indicated that, notwithstanding P's participation,
he could bring an action to recover the trust property that had found its
way to D's hands: 89
It was quite open to the Plaintiff in this case, in a suit properly constituted, to
have alleged the insufficiency of this security either with or without an alleged
breach of trust, and the refusal of his co-trustee to call in the security and to see
that the moneys were placed out in proper investments. It was open to him to
have filed a bill for that purpose.
This principle is still very much alive, and has been applied in
significantly more modern cases. In the Australian case of Young v
Murphy,90 the standing of trustees and company directors to bring actions
against themselves or their predecessors was extensively reviewed by the
Court of Appeal.
In that case, the court expressly rejected arguments that the
beneficiaries needed to play an enhanced role in bringing the action. It
was held that the long-standing rule is that the beneficiary is only required
to bring the action themselves where there is a dispute between the
beneficiaries,91 as in that case there are grounds to say that the trustee will
not properly represent the interests of them all.92 The discussion on this
87 (1877-78) LR 7 Ch.D. 116.
8 (1877) 5 Ch.D. 554 (Fry J).
89 Butler (n 87) 120 (Baggally LJ).
90 [1996] 1 VR 279.
91 ibid 285.
92 ibid 283.
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point is particularly relevant, because it is made in reference to English
law from 200 years ago, and so the reasoning is directly applicable in
English cases.
The standing question arose recently in the English courts in
Bracken Partners Ltd. v Gutteridge.93 In that case, an action was brought
on behalf of a company, EGL, that had knowingly received property
obtained in breach of fiduciary duty, and was therefore liable under the
doctrine of knowing receipt. 94 Although the central question in that case
was whether EGL had sufficient interest in the property to participate in
the claim, it is significant that EGL's breach of fiduciary duty was not
seen as a bar to them having standing. 95 This appears to be the opposite
conclusion to that reached by Lloyd LJ in Pitt. What is particularly
striking about the Gutteridge case is that the main judgment was given by
Mummery U, who also sat on Pitt - despite this, in the latter case he felt
able to support Lloyd LJ's conclusion on this point, saying:96
(e) a claim for breach of fiduciary duty would not normally be made by a
fiduciary (as has happened in practice under the Hastings-Bass rule), but rather
against a fiduciary by a person claiming to be an object of the power;
In all of these authorities, then, there was no question of there being any
difficulty with the trustee suing on the basis of their own breach. It is
difficult to see why in Pitt the position has moved, without discussion, to
such action being taboo.
(a) A Duty to Sue?
Some cases have gone even further, and have tended to indicate that not
only can a trustee sue for his own breach, but has a positive duty to do so.
This arose first in Baynard v Woolley. 97 Rejecting an argument that the
plaintiff trustee could not sue for a wrong in which he had participated,
the court said:98
93 [2003] EWCA Civ 1875, [2004] 1 BCLC 377.
94 ibid [14].
95 ibid [16].
96 Pitt (n 1) [231], (emphasis in the original).
97 52 ER 729; (1855) 20 Beav. 583.
98 ibid 585 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added).
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This Court would undoubtedly compel the other trustee to make good the breach
of trust, though the Plaintiff may have concurred in it, it being his duty to secure
the trust fund for the benefit of the cestuis que trust, and to such a suit the
trustees alone are necessary parties. The books are full of cases, in which the
trustees have called on their co-trustees to replace funds, notwithstanding they
have themselves been guilty of acts not in accordance with their duty.
It is worth noting in particular that this passage goes significantly beyond
stating that trustees are entitled to sue, and appears to suggest they have a
positive duty to do so. This reasoning was echoed by the Australian Court
of Appeal in Young:99
the trustee's right and duty to sue is part of his duty to get in the trust estate,
which includes rights of action against co-trustees or former trustees ...
Again, these cases were not referred to by Lloyd U, so we have no
explanation of why the position in Pitt was any different.
(b) The Policy Reasoning
Even if Lloyd U's position on standing is difficult to relate to the
previous case law, is it nonetheless justifiable on policy grounds? The
underlying consideration in his mind seems to have been to prevent the
supposedly pernicious practice of trustees bringing actions against
themselves without the commitment of the beneficiaries; he stated that his
new principle would require beneficiaries to 'grasp the nettle' of proving
breach of fiduciary duty. 100 Similar observations were made at first
instance in Futter v Futter by Norris J, who said that the possibility of
trustees complaining of 'untrustee-like behaviour' by themselves in order
to set their own acts aside raised the possibility 'that the development of
the rule may have been diverted from its true course.'"01
However, it is submitted that denying standing to trustees is not an
appropriate course to take to prevent this practice, for three reasons. First,
it can be questioned whether there is really a problem with trustees suing
upon their own breach. As noted above, cases such as Young have held
that a trustee will be allowed standing in similar situations since it is
9 [1996] 1 VR 279, 284 (emphasis added).
100 Pitt (n 1) [130].
101 [2010] EWHC 449 (Ch) [2].
66
Control of Trustee Discretion
ultimately in the interests of the beneficiaries to allow the trustees to get
the property back into the trust. 102 If the money were in principle
recoverable in a case following Pitt, and the trustees ready and willing to
act, an insistence on requiring the beneficiaries to initiate the action would
be puzzling - it would be rather more efficient to allow the trustees to
proceed, especially considering that they will often be professionals and
perhaps more qualified to do so than the beneficiaries.
Secondly, it could be argued that the restriction of standing was
designed to restrict the number of cases of this type that were brought.
The courts do seem to have been somewhat burdened by the millstone
they created; Norris J in Futter referred exasperatedly to 'another'
application by trustees seeking to undo their actions and avoid tax
consequences.103 However, this prompts the second point; this burden has
been considerably lessened by the other changes made by Pitt. Most of
the cases 104 under the old rule concerned trustees who were poorly
advised; all such cases have now been diverted away from the rule by
Lloyd LJ's imposing a requirement that a breach of duty be shown. He
himself explicitly discussed the professional advice, and was of the view
that where trustees had sought advice which had been given incorrectly
breach of duty would not be made out. 105 The standing restriction
therefore seems somewhat superfluous if limiting the number of cases
was the primary concern.
Thirdly, the ability of the trustees to take the action is inherent in
their role as actors in the interests of the beneficiaries. Again, this point
was the foundation of the findings in Young; Brooking J quoted Porter
M.R. in Carson v Sloanel0 6: 'If one of the [beneficiaries] could follow the
trust, why cannot the trustee who represents them all?'"0 7 To make this
point slightly differently, as was indicated in Young, 08 suing in respect of
one's own breach is merely an action in line with the continuing duty of
102 Young (n 90) 282 (Brooking J).
103 [2010] EWHC 449 (Ch) [2].
104 For example Futter v Futter [2010] EWHC 449 (Ch); Pitt v Holt [2010] EWHC 45
(Ch); Sieffv Fox [2005] EWHC 1312 (Ch.); Abacus Trust Co v Barr [2003] EWHC
114 (Ch.).
105 Pitt (n 1) [125].
106 (1884) 13 LR Ir 139.
107 (1996) 1 VR 279, 283.
108 ibid.
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the trustee to get in the trust property. If this ongoing duty is to be
curtailed for some reason in particular circumstances, it is for Lloyd U to
justify why the status quo has been altered, as well as why significant
authority has been departed from. As indicated above, such a justification
is absent from Pitt.
E. FIDUCIARIES
1. Fiduciary Duties
In setting out his second category of case, Lloyd LJ frequently referred to
the duty to take into account only and all relevant considerations as a
fiduciary duty.109 The difficulty with this use of terminology is that there
is significant debate over the boundaries of fiduciary duties, and whether
or not it is possible for a fiduciary to owe a non-fiduciary duty.
The relevance of this distinction, as discussed by Lord Millett in
Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew, goes beyond that of clarity
in legal taxonomy." 0 The practical implication is principally felt at the
stage of remedies. Put broadly, demonstrating a breach of a common law
duty is subject to certain requirements, such as a remoteness limitation on
causation etc. These limitations do not apply with the same rigour where
the breach of duty is fiduciary."'
The difficulty with the judgment in Pitt is that, being primarily
concerned with the void/voidable debate, Lloyd LJ's references to a
fiduciary duty appear to have been an example of an 'unthinking resort to
verbal formulae.'1 1 2 He appears to have conflated the duty of skill and
care and fiduciary duties, despite the sharp distinction drawn by Lord
Millett in Mothew:113
It seems to me that Mrs Pitt fulfilled any duty of skill and care she was under by
looking for advice to her solicitors acting in the litigation, either to advise her or
to see that she got whatever advice she needed from another source, such as
109 Pitt (n 1) [127].
110 [1998] Ch. 1, 17.
cf. John Dyson Heydon, 'Are the Duties of Company Directors to Exercise Care
and Skill Fiduciary?' in Simone Degeling and James Edelman (eds), Equity in
Commercial Law (Thomson LBC 2005), esp. 189-191.
112 Mothew (n 110) 16.
113 Pitt (n 1) [163].
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from Frenkel Topping. In those circumstances, I cannot accept that, in entering
into the two deeds on 1 November 1994, Mrs Pitt can be said to have been acting
in breach of her fiduciary duties owed to Mr Pitt.
Lacking a clear position within the debate over the term fiduciary, it will
be necessary to consider in some detail the competing sides in this debate
if we are to understand whether the duty is properly termed fiduciary or
not. Much of the literature relates to other duties, owed by different types
of fiduciaries, but is relevant in order to work out some basic principles
for distinguishing fiduciary from other duties. Once these principles have
been worked out, they can be applied to the duty identified in Pitt.
2. Two Approaches
The principal debate in this area is over how the word 'fiduciary' is to be
employed. The first approach, which may be termed 'historical', is to
examine all the duties owed by persons who have been identified by the
courts as holding a fiduciary position, and from an examination of their
position in relation to the principal divine the purpose for which fiduciary
duties are imposed. Getzler, for example, has adopted an analysis led by a
desire to ensure that fiduciaries are appropriately deterred from acting
against the interests of their principal, since the principal is in a uniquely
vulnerable position to the power of the fiduciary.1 4 Historical analyses
frequently focus upon the consequences of a breach of fiduciary duty, and
discussions of policy motivations for applying the stricter fiduciary rules
to different breaches of duty."'
The second, more modern approach, is to focus on those duties that
are peculiarly owed by fiduciaries, and then examine those duties in order
to come to a coherent understanding of fiduciary doctrine. This was
pioneered by Finn in his classic analysis of fiduciary duties, Fiduciary
Obligations, where he made a comprehensive attempt to classify and
analyse the duties owed by fiduciaries. He outlined his approach as
follows:116
114 Joshua Getzler, 'Am I My Beneficiary's Keeper? Fusion and Loss-Based Fiduciary
Remedies' in Simone Degeling and James Edelman (n 111), esp. 271.
115 ibid 263; Heydon (n 111), esp. 220-225.
116 Paul D. Finn, Fiduciary Obligations (The Law Book Company Ltd. 1977) 2.
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It is not because a person is a 'fiduciary' or a 'confidant' that a rule applies to
him. It is because a particular rule applies to him that he is a fiduciary or
confidant ...
This mantle has been taken over more recently by Conaglen, who takes a
slightly different approach - of the duties owed by fiduciaries, he selects
only those exclusive to them, and then attempts to understand what
distinguishes these duties from all others. He describes this as the
'Mothew principle', since it is inspired by the observations of Lord Millett
in the Mothew case. His (somewhat controversial" 7 ) conclusion is that the
only exclusively fiduciary duties are those of to avoid conflicts or to make
profits from the fiduciary position, 118 and that these duties exist to
'provide a subsidiary and prophylactic form of protection for non-
fiduciary duties.'l 19
We might summarise the difference between the two approaches by
saying that the historical approach looks for a fiduciary label first, and
then considers what duties the fiduciary owes, whereas the modem
approach is to look for exclusively fiduciary duties, and then attach the
label to whoever owes them. Each approach has its problems - the
question is, which is overall the more convincing approach.
3. Problems with Historical Analyses
Conaglen identifies two problems with the historical approach 2 0 . First, it
now appears to be out of step with the courts. He gives numerous
examples of the acceptance of the Mothew principle, not only in this
country, but around the common law world. A failure to adopt the new
approach will ultimately lead to a theory that is out of touch with what the
courts are doing on the ground. This is a fair point, but its strength should
not be over-emphasised. If the Pitt case teaches us nothing else, it is that
the law can be set down the wrong path and we should always be alive to
the possibility that the orthodoxy is incorrect.
Secondly, it results in a lack of conceptual clarity in understanding
the role of a fiduciary, and the justifications for the peculiar legal
117 For criticism see Rebecca Lee, 'In Search of the Nature and Function of Fiduciary
Loyalty: Some Observations on Conaglen's Analysis' (2007) 27 OJLS 327.
118 Mattew Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty (Hart Publishing 2010) Ch. 3.
119 ibid 4.
120 ibid 21.
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consequences attendant upon a breach of fiduciary duty.121 Attempting to
incorporate all of the duties owed by a fiduciary into the fiduciary concept
results in a definition that is broadly stated and somewhat unhelpful. For
example, Getzler characterises fiduciary duties as responding to a
dependency formed from the difficulty of monitoring the fiduciary, and
the special vulnerability of the principal. 122 But this definition of
'fiduciary' is not sufficiently precise to set any outer limits. Anyone in a
contractual relationship, for example, is vulnerable to a breach by the
other party, since it might cause them significant loss. And the negligence
duty of care is arguably a similar response to vulnerability as fiduciary
doctrine - pedestrians are vulnerable to the actions of a negligent driver,
for instance. This point seems implicitly accepted in Getzler'S 123 and
Heydon's12 4 argument that the beneficiaries are as vulnerable to the want
of care of their fiduciary as they are their disloyalty - however, neither
explain why these contract or tort duties are not fiduciary by their
definition. In attempting to incorporate all duties owed by fiduciaries,
their definitions are too expansive to be helpful.
This second point can be pushed significantly further - without
developing a sound understanding of what makes fiduciaries different
from other actors, arguments based on the historical approach can fail to
be even internally coherent. A good illustration of this is the argument
presented by JD Heydon. 125 His chapter is useful because it not only
adopts a somewhat historical approach to the definition of fiduciary, but
also appears to be somewhat anti-definitional, in that it attacks the
Mothew approach without clearly putting in place an alternative
conception of the meaning of fiduciary.
This failure has far-reaching consequences for Heydon's argument,
because without this reference point, his argument inevitably becomes
inconsistent. In particular, he falsely concludes that some parts of the law
are anomalous because he fails to observe them from a fixed standpoint.
A good example of this is where he argues that failing to regard the duty
121 ibid
122 Getzler (above n 114) 271.
123 ibid 241.
124 Heydon (above n 111) 217.
125 ibid 185.
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of care and skill leads to an 'imbalance of remedies and wrongs.'l26 He
points out that the duty of good faith, which requires culpable fraud, and
the no profit duty, which can be breached innocently, are both usually
regarded as fiduciary duties. It would therefore be illogical for the duty of
care and skill, which requires an intermediate culpable state, to not be
regarded as fiduciary also.12 7 This conclusion may be correct; but if no
definition of fiduciary is offered, it is impossible to say whether or not
mental culpability is the correct yardstick to be applying.
An analogy may be drawn with the general law. Contracts, which
impose strict liability for breach of duty, contain obligations that are
entered into voluntarily. Negligence creates liability at a higher standard,
requiring a breach of standard of care, and unjust enrichment does so at a
lower standard, requiring no breach of any duty - in both cases liability is
imposed by law. Applying the yardstick of voluntariness, it seems
illogical that liability is imposed by the law in situations of a negligent
breach and of no breach, but that strict liability, which falls between the
two, must be undertaken voluntarily through a contract. The fallacy is the
same; the imbalance is only apparent, created by a failure to understand
why we distinguish between contracts, torts and unjust enrichment.
Returning to fiduciaries, the reason for 'imbalance', Heydon points
out, is obvious if one adopts Conaglen's definition of fiduciary duties -
the no profit duty is peculiarly fiduciary because it is directed to procuring
the diligent execution of other duties, whereas the duty of care and skill is
not. 128 That Conaglen is able to explain this apparent anomaly while
Heydon is not illustrates the weakness of the historical approach.
4. Problems with the Mothew Approach
The Mothew analysis displaces all duties that are not exclusive to
fiduciaries and banishes them into other realms of the law. However, not
all commentators regard this as an appropriate step, at least not without
modification. For instance, Getzler, identifying vulnerability as the heart
of the fiduciary obligation,129 argues that the fiduciary and contractual
126 ibid 225.
127 ibid.
128 Conaglen (n 118) Ch. 4. It should be noted that Conaglen also regards the duty of
good faith as non-fiduciary, so for him this imbalance simply does not arise: 40-4.
129 Getzler (above n 114) 272.
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relationships should be expanded to cover much of the ground that, after
Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd,130 is covered by the
tortious duty of care.131
The central claim of this argument is that there is a distinction
between the duty of care applied to fiduciaries and non-fiduciaries which
should be recognised. However, there is nothing in Conaglen's argument
that rejects this possibility; indeed, he specifically accepts that different
duties of care can apply to different actors:1 32
[T]he argument advanced here is not dependent on the existence of a
'monotonic' duty of care... Duties of care do not need to be identical amongst all
... actors for them to be grouped together and described as duties of care.
On closer inspection, then, it appears that there is no substantial
disagreement between Getzler and Conaglen on this point - both accept
that the duty of care can be modified in respect of fiduciaries.
One potential source of genuine disagreement is over the question of
whether or not the duty of care applicable to fiduciaries is peculiar and
unique to them. If the duty of care simply flexes to meet the factual
demands of each case, then there is no problem with Conaglen's
classification of the duty of care as non-fiduciary. However, if it appears
that the existence of a fiduciary relationship will always lead to the
adoption of a particular standard, then that standard will be peculiar to
fiduciaries and will pass the Mothew test as a duty owed exclusively by a
fiduciary. This would render Conaglen's expulsion of the duty of care
from the category of fiduciary duties erroneous.
In order to make this argument successfully, it would be necessary to
show that the same standard of care is applied to all fiduciaries, and that it
is materially different from that applied at common law. However, there
is significant evidence that that is not the case. Conaglen1 33 gives the
example of Lagunas Nitrate Co. Ltd. v Lagunas Syndicatel3 4 where it was
specifically accepted that the standard of care applicable to a director
130 [1964] AC 465.
131 Getzler (n 114) 271.
132 Conaglen (n 118) 101.
133 ibid 15.
134 [1899] 2 Ch. 392.
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would not be the same as that applied to a trustee.'35 This indicates that
the duty of care flexes to particular circumstances, as Conaglen's model
allows, but there is no peculiarly fiduciary notion of the 'duty of care'.
5. Summary of Principles
The foregoing analysis has accepted Conaglen's definitional approach as
the more attractive, following Mothew. The only duties that are fiduciary
are those that are owed exclusively by fiduciaries, namely the duty to
avoid conflicts of interests and the duty not to make profit from the
position of fiduciary. Other duties, such as the duty of care, are non-
fiduciary. Their content might be altered by the existence of a fiduciary
relationship, but not in a sufficiently uniform way to give them an
independent identity as fiduciary duties.
6. Applying the Framework
Returning to our discussion of the new duty in Pitt, the question remains,
is it properly termed a fiduciary duty?
Adopting Conaglen's approach, the critical question in assessing
whether or not the duty is fiduciary is whether or not it is owed
exclusively by fiduciaries. On this test, the duty to take into account only
and all relevant considerations is not fiduciary - many examples can be
given of this duty arising in other contexts. Clearly, the duty to take into
account all relevant considerations will form part of the duty of care owed
by advisors in negligence - in Pitt v Holt for instance, the same failure to
take into consideration the effect of the taxation legislation resulted in a
tort claim against the solicitors.136 And to take a very different example, in
the case of R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex. p.
Bentley' 37 it was held that the Home Secretary's decision not to grant a
pardon was reviewable because he had failed to take into account all the
forms such a pardon could take.
135 ibid 435.
136 [2010] EWHC 45 (Ch) [14].
137 [1994] QB 349.
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7. Conclusion
Lloyd LJ's description of the duty to take into account only and all
relevant considerations as fiduciary was erroneous. When that term is
properly understood, it cannot be applied to the duty identified in Pitt.
F. DRAFTING OUT OF PITT
The final remaining question from the judgment in Pitt is the practical
consequences of the decision. Lloyd LJ appeared to consider that the
decision would have wide-ranging consequences on cases, particularly
those in his second category. However, there is a possibility that settlors
might prefer the old scheme, and employ careful drafting in order to
ensure that defective decisions by their trustees result in void, and not
merely voidable, dispositions. Why might a settlor choose to do so, and
what methods could be employed?
1. Commercial Motivation
The key reason why the settlor might wish to prescribe voidness is in
order to give greater protection to his beneficiaries, by allowing them to
avoid pernicious consequences regardless of the interference of third party
rights or any other consideration. This protective argument was one of the
main justifications that was given for the voidness rule under Hastings-
Bass, 138 and the drafting suggested below would have precisely the same
effect.
This additional protection may be particularly important in cases that
involve trustees who have received professional advice. Under the new
law, as set out by the Court of Appeal in Pitt, for a breach to fall within
category two and trigger voidability it is necessary to show a breach of
the relevant duty. However, where incorrect advice has been received and
acted on by the trustee (as was the case in Pitt), there will be no such
breach. The beneficiary will therefore be left out of pocket as a result of
the innocent mistake of the trustee. A settlor may be dissatisfied with this
situation, and wish to prescribe voidness in order to throw the risk of any
such mistake onto third parties dealing with the trustee.
As a partial answer to this concern, several cases have pointed out
that the beneficiary would be able to pursue a negligence action against
138 Hayton et al (n 17) 859.
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the advisor who gave the negligent advice. This observation was repeated
most recently in Pitt. However, this might also face its own difficulties; in
particular, it might be that it is impossible to show that the advisor acted
negligently, for instance where the mistake arises because of a clerical
error introduced by an intermediate communication system. Indeed,
weaknesses in the alternatives were noted in Pitt'39 and, while Lloyd U
did not feel that they forced him to reconsider his conclusions on
principle, they might well deter a concerned settlor from relying upon his
scheme and compel him to draft in his own safeguard.
Finally, settlors may wish to avoid Lloyd U's second category in
order to ensure that their trustees have standing to sue in respect of their
mistakes. As has been discussed above, the position in relation to standing
within category two is somewhat unclear; Pitt indicated that it would be
inappropriate for a trustee to bring such an action, but this may be
regarded as inconsistent with earlier cases.140 In category one, the trustee
is on firmer ground; it is reasonably clear from cases such as Re
Abraham's Will Trusts141 that in the pre-Pitt case law the trustees could
bring an action in order to determine if what they have done is within the
terms of the trust. However, the reasoning which lead to the conclusion
that it would be inappropriate for a trustee to bring an action seems to be
limited to cases where a breach of fiduciary duty is in issue, i.e. cases
within category two. 142 This may seem an unimportant point, but
experience of the pre-Pitt case law indicates that this was an option
deployed by many trustees, so it would seem that there is some value in
ensuring that issues of mistaken transactions can be resolved without
involving the beneficiaries.
2. Achieving these Aims
If a settlor wished to obtain these advantages, there a number of ways he
could go about it. One possible mechanism for doing so is suggested by
the analysis of Professor Matthews. It will be recalled that his analysis of
the pre-Pitt position was that the declaration that the transaction was void
made perfect sense as an application of an implied term within the trust
139 Pitt (n 1) [128].
140 See text accompanying footnote 78 et seq.
141 [1969] 1 Ch 463.
142 Pitt (n 1) [130].
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deed. 143 He used this analysis to defend the view that voidness was the
correct outcome in Hastings-Bass cases. Logically, precisely the same
outcome could be achieved if an express term to the same effect were
placed in the trust deed, for instance:
It shall be a condition precedent to the exercise of this power that the trustee has,
in making his decision, taken into account all and only relevant considerations.
The effect of such a term would prima facie be to change all failures to
take into account only and all relevant considerations into acts outside the
scope of the power, rendering them void as per Lloyd LJ's category one.
It will also be recalled that Matthews' argument was criticised, on
the basis that it would be inconsistent with Pitt to make such a
supposition and that his analysis offered no account for the central role of
causation in the previous case law. 14 4 However, none of these criticisms
go so far as to deny the effectiveness of an express provision to the same
effect. It would not be inconsistent with Pitt to give effect to such a
clause, since exercises of power specifically outside the terms of the trust
deed were identified by Lloyd LJ as within category one and therefore
void. The point about causation is irrelevant, since it is a point merely
about the lack of fit with the analysis in previous cases; at best, it serves
to illustrate that causation would form no part of the inquiry if such a
clause were inserted into the trust deed. And the implausibility of
implying such a term is plainly irrelevant in circumstances where the term
is expressly included.
3. Reaction of the Courts
Even if a carefully drafted trust deed might place all mistakes in category
one, the question remains as to whether the courts would accept the
effectiveness of such a clause. There might be some reluctance to allow
settlors to override the scheme that Lloyd U so carefully worked out.
However, it seems likely the attempt would be successful. Settlors
generally have freedom of trust, and so may make whatever provisions
they like in their own deeds. This freedom seems particularly extensive;
for instance, settlors may modify or exclude the liability of their trustees
143 See text accompanying footnote 48 et seq.
144 ibid.
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to a considerable extent. The only thing the courts will not permit them to
do is exclude liability for fraud.'4 5 If the courts were to take a radically
different position in relation to cases within Pitt, that would need
considerable justification.
The court might take the view that the parties should not be allowed
to circumvent the important policy considerations that have influenced the
structure created, and any attempt to do so will be declared ineffective.
However, usually declaring a transaction as contrary to policy is reserved
only for the most extreme cases, such as immorality or illegality, and the
courts have exhibited a reluctance to expand its role.146 Furthermore, such
a course would be at odds with past decisions that have given parties
freedom of trust even in the face of potentially overriding policy
objections. The example of excluding trustee liability is again useful here
- in the case of Armitage v Nurse, significant judicial disapproval was
poured over the practice of excluding trustee liability: 14 7
At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the view is widely held that
these clauses have gone too far, and that trustees who charge for their services
and who, as professional men, would not dream of excluding liability for
ordinary professional negligence should not be able to rely on a trustee
exemption clause excluding liability for gross negligence ...
However, ultimately the Court felt it was not its role to interfere: 14 8
If clauses such as [the exclusion clause in this case] are to be denied effect, then
in my opinion this should be done by Parliament, which will have the advantage
of wide consultation with interested bodies and the advice of the Trust Law
Committee.
The resilience of the freedom of trust argument in the face of a foolproof
trust is significantly strengthened when it is recalled that the policy
argument in that case - distribution of risk and liability between the
parties - is essentially the same as that in the case of Pitt.
14 5 Armitage v Nurse [1998] Ch. 241.
146 See, in the context of contract, Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v Sampson
(1875) LR 19 Eq. 462; and for a general overview see Edwin Peel, Treitel on the Law
of Contract (12th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2007) para. 11-105.
147 [1998] Ch. 241, 256.
148 ibid.
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G. CONCLUSION
The judgment in Pitt has radically altered the landscape of court control of
trustee discretion. There is significant cause to doubt whether all the
problems with the old rule have been solved; just a few problems with the
new position have been outlined here. It is perhaps apt that the editor of
Snell has, in a recent revision, replaced the section entitled 'the rule in Re
Hastings-Bass' with a new one called 'the rule in Pitt'. 149 The
controversies of the old law are gone, but only to be replaced by new
ones.
H. POSTSCRIPT
On 1 August 2011, permission was granted for an appeal in the case of
Pitt v Holt to the Supreme Court. At the time of going to print, that appeal
had not been heard, and so it remains to be seen whether the position
outlined by Lloyd LJ will be substantially altered, or the problems
outlines above dealt with.
149 McGhee (n 60).
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